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ABSTRACT
Over the last decades, scientists have questioned the origin of the exquisite humanmastery of tools.
Seminal studies in monkeys, healthy participants and brain-damaged patients have primarily
focused on the plastic changes that tool-use induces on spatial representations. More recently,
we focused on the modiﬁcations tool-use must exert on the sensorimotor system and
highlighted plastic changes at the level of the body representation used by the brain to control
our movements, i.e., the Body Schema. Evidence is emerging for tool-use to affect also more
visually and conceptually based representations of the body, such as the Body Image. Here we
offer a critical review of the way different tool-use paradigms have been, and should be, used to
try disentangling the critical features that are responsible for tool incorporation into different
body representations. We will conclude that tool-use may offer a very valuable means to
investigate high-order body representations and their plasticity.
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Performing accurate and efﬁcient movements implies
that the brain can access and integrate neural
representations of both the body and the space
around it. This integrated processing is even more
challenging in the case of actions performed with
tools, as one needs to transfer the control of the
body to that of a mechanical effector. Humans have
come to an exquisite level of mastery in tool-use, as
dramatically witnessed when brain damage breaks
this capability down, leading to apraxic deﬁcits.
While the cognitive motor and neural processes that
allow for accurate tool-use have been extensively
studied (Buxbaum, Shapiro, & Coslett, 2014; Golden-
berg & Spatt, 2009; Hermsdörfer, Li, Randerath,
Roby-Brami, & Goldenberg, 2013; Osiurak & Massen,
2014; Tarhan, Watson, & Buxbaum, 2015), in the
present review we focus on the possibility that part
of tool-mastery may emerge from the capability of
incorporating tools into body representations (BR), as
postulated by several theories (Arbib, Bonaiuto,
Jacobs, & Frey, 2009; Cardinali et al., 2012; Farnè,
Serino, & Làdavas, 2007; Jacobs, Bussel, Combeaud,
& Roby-Brami, 2009; Maravita & Iriki, 2004). Many
different approaches have been used to address the
issue of how tools get incorporated into neural rep-
resentations. Since the seminal monkey electrophysi-
ology work by Iriki and colleagues (Iriki, Tanaka, &
Iwamura, 1996), tool-use has been repeatedly
reported to cause transient changes in a spatial rep-
resentation termed peripersonal space (PPS). As it
has recently become clear that tool-use may also
affect bodily representations (Cardinali, Frassinetti,
et al., 2009), a certain degree of confusion remains
on how tool incorporation can and should be investi-
gated as a function of the nature of the target brain
representation. Here, for sake of completeness and
because the historical focus has been put on remap-
ping space with tools, we start by recalling some
basic aspects of the peripersonal space leading to its
plasticity. We then introduce some of the body
representations that, across different dyadic and
triadic models, are relevant to the purpose of this
review and try to identify the conditions under
which their plasticity becomes apparent following
tool-use tasks.
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1. Peripersonal space: A region of
multisensory integration
Peripersonal space (PPS), deﬁned as the space
immediately surrounding the body, is now well
accepted as a region of integration of somatosensory,
visual, and auditory information (Graziano & Cooke,
2006; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Gallese, 1997). It is
a privileged interface for interaction with nearby
objects, whether one performs a goal-directed
action, or wants to protect oneself from an incoming
threat. Its physiological bases have been ﬁrst discov-
ered in non-human primates, where monkeys’
bimodal visuotactile neurons were described almost
40 years ago. These neurons, initially recorded from
the ventral premotor cortex (area F4), respond to
both tactile and visual stimuli within the immediate
proximity of the monkey’s arm (Rizzolatti, Scandolara,
Matelli, & Gentilucci, 1981a, 1981b), thus providing the
PPS with a clear set of neurophysiological properties
(see, for review, Brozzoli, Demattè, Pavani, Frassinetti,
& Farnè, 2006; Brozzoli, Makin, Cardinali, Holmes, &
Farnè, 2012; di Pellegrino & Làdavas, 2015; Làdavas &
Serino, 2008; Makin, Holmes, Brozzoli, & Farnè, 2012).
Based on these properties, a number of studies have
proposed that a similar representation of PPS exists
in humans: For example, many studies on cross-
modal visual–tactile extinction, which we quickly
recall below, have reported that this pathological
sign may vary as a function of the distance of visual
stimuli from the patients’ hands and that this PPS dis-
tance becomes larger after tool-use (Farnè & Làdavas,
2000; Maravita, Spence, Clarke, Husain, & Driver, 2000).
Tool-use “extends” the peripersonal space
Over the last decades, several studies have focused on
how tool-use could modify the PPS, from non-human
primates to healthy humans, through neurological
patients, the latter being principally in the domain of
hemispatial neglect and extinction following right
brain-damage. The ﬁrst, extremely inﬂuential, study
providing evidence in monkeys for tool-use to be
capable of modifying the PPS has been reported by
Iriki and colleagues (Iriki et al., 1996). Monkeys, who
had been previously trained to learn using a rake-
shaped tool, were conditioned to use the rake to
retrieve for a few minutes some pieces of food that
were otherwise out of their arm reach. By comparing
the activity of parietal bimodal cells (i.e., cells respond-
ing to both tactile and visual stimuli, provided the
latter originated from the immediate proximity of
the hand-centred tactile receptive ﬁeld) before and
after the use of the rake, the authors found that,
after tool-use, their visual receptive ﬁelds were
enlarged along the tool axis. Despite the original
interpretation emphasizing the tool-use-induced
change in body schema (BS), these neurons’ responses
were modiﬁed so as to cover the animal’s newly
enlarged reaching space, functionally extended by
the tool, thus testifying for the remapping of the PPS.
A similar form of representational plasticity has
been revealed in humans as well, at ﬁrst in neurologi-
cal patients, through cross-modal visual–tactile extinc-
tion paradigms. These studies on right-brain-damaged
patients focused on the patients’ inability to detect
tactile stimulations, administered to their contrale-
sional left hand, when a visual stimulus was delivered
concurrently to their ipsilesional right hand. Numerous
studies have established that this visual–tactile form of
extinction is stronger when the visual stimulus is dis-
played in the peri-hand space (di Pellegrino,
Làdavas, & Farnè, 1997; see, for review, Brozzoli
et al., 2006, 2012). Most interesting for the present pur-
poses, several studies additionally reported that, after
a short period of active tool-use, cross-modal extinc-
tion was more severe for further distances, testifying
for the extension of PPS (Farnè, Bonifazi, & Làdavas,
2005; Farnè, Iriki, & Làdavas, 2005; Farnè & Làdavas,
2000; Farnè et al., 2007; Làdavas, 2002; Maravita,
Husain, Clarke, & Driver, 2001; Maravita & Iriki,
2004). Similar ﬁndings have been established thanks
to studies on spatial neglect, with patients who experi-
ence deﬁcits to report, orient, or respond to stimuli
originating from the contralesional space, resulting
in a rightward bias when asked to bisect lines
(Ackroyd, Riddoch, Humphreys, Nightingale, & Town-
send, 2002; Berti & Frassinetti, 2000; Neppi-Mòdona
et al., 2007; Pegna et al., 2001). Berti and Frassinetti
(2000) reported the ﬁrst evidence for tool-use-depen-
dent remapping of space in a case study of a neglect
patient with a dissociation between near and far space
following a stroke in the right hemisphere. This patient
exhibited neglect symptoms in the near space, result-
ing in the usual rightward bias when performing the
line bisection task with a laser pen, but not in the far
space. Interestingly, when performing the task in the
far space with a long stick allowing them to reach
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the line, the classical rightward bias re-emerged. Using
the stick as a tool to expand the patient’s arm literally
made the far space become near, possibly by extend-
ing the PPS to incorporate the stick in it. The opposite
remapping direction – that is, the near space becom-
ing far – is also possible, especially when using a tool
that prevents sensory continuity with the target and
activates the far space, such as a laser-pen (Neppi-
Mòdona et al., 2007). Neppi-Mòdona et al. (2007)
observed that when using such a tool, some neglect
patients would remap the near space as being far in
line bisection tasks (e.g., the neglect bias in the near
space became as severe as in the far space). Comple-
mentarily, in a patient with a severe neglect in the near
space they observed a reduced, even suppressed
neglect bias when using a laser-pen that seemed indu-
cing a dominance of far space coding. Near space
coding implied a continuity between the tool and
the target, visual feedback from this tool in the near
space, and tactile proprioceptive feedback from the
same tool in the far space. Conversely, the absence
of these feedbacks indicated a far space represen-
tation (Neppi-Mòdona et al., 2007).
Neglect-like symptoms in the near space (or PPS)
have been successfully induced in healthy subjects fol-
lowing a transient perturbation of the right posterior
parietal cortex (rPPC), a region known to be activated
during line bisection tasks (Fink et al., 2000; Fink, Mar-
shall, Weiss, & Zilles, 2001), through transcranial mag-
netic stimulation (TMS; Bjoertomt, Cowey, & Walsh,
2002; Fierro et al., 2000; Fierro, Brighina, Piazza,
Oliveri, & Bisiach, 2001; Giglia et al., 2015) or transcra-
nial direct current stimulation (tDCS; Giglia et al.,
2011). Crucially, Giglia and coworkers (Giglia et al.,
2015) have recently reported that tool-use transfers
the same TMS-induced neglect-like bias from the
near towards the far space in healthy subjects, just
as in neglect patients, thus testifying once again that
the use of a long tool can remap the far space as
nearer. In addition, this study provided direct evidence
suggesting that the rPPC is fundamental for PPS rep-
resentation (see also Serino, Canzoneri, & Avenanti,
2011).
The tool-use “power” of affecting different forms of
spatial cognition does not only rely on patients, or
patient-like evidence. Actually, changes in perception
have been reported also in non-perturbed neurologi-
cal (i.e., neurotypical) conditions. These effects have
been attributed either to the preparation or intention
to use a tool (Witt, Profﬁtt, & Epstein, 2005), or to lower
level aspects of multisensory perception (see below).
Witt et al. (2005) asked healthy participants to
perform a perceptual matching task: A target was pro-
jected in front of them either beyond or within their
reach, and they had to touch it, either with their
hand or with a baton. For out-of-reach targets, sub-
jects had to reach as far as they could. Then, they
had to visually match the distance separating them
from the ﬁrst target. Targets were perceived as
being closer to the body than they actually were
when reached by the baton. More interestingly, no
such effect was observed when participants were pas-
sively holding the baton and were not asked to do
anything with it: Reachability inﬂuenced distance per-
ception, but only when the subjects intended to reach
for the target.
Hence, active tool-use appears to be necessary for
PPS remapping, a ﬁnding that has been replicated
several times (Anelli, Candini, Cappelletti, Oliveri, &
Frassinetti, 2015; Farnè, Bonifazi, et al., 2005; Iriki
et al., 1996; Maravita, Clarke, Husain, & Driver, 2002;
Maravita, Spence, Kennett, & Driver, 2002; Serino, Bas-
solino, Farnè, & Làdavas, 2007). Only passively holding
the tool is not sufﬁcient to trigger changes in PPS
(Anelli et al., 2015; Farnè, Bonifazi, et al., 2005; Farnè,
Iriki, et al., 2005; Farnè & Làdavas, 2000; A. Rossetti,
Romano, Bolognini, & Maravita, 2015; Witt et al.,
2005), but it appears that it is the functional instead
of the mere physical length of a tool that can modu-
late the extent of PPS elongation (Farnè, Iriki, et al.,
2005). Peripersonal space remapping also appeared
to be speciﬁc to experience and to be transient:
Farnè and Làdavas (2000) reported that while PPS
extension was observed immediately after tool-use
in extinction patients, such effects were ephemeral,
disappearing after a few minutes of passive holding
of the tool. Similar ﬁndings were reported by Serino
and others (Serino et al., 2007) in healthy but blind-
folded subjects using a blind cane for a few minutes
to explore the environment: When they were tested
the following day, the previously extended PPS
shrank back to its original dimension. In contrast,
blind people who used the cane in everyday life had
their PPS already extended towards the cane tip
while holding it. Interestingly, when they were pas-
sively holding a weight-matched cane handle (i.e.,
not providing any gain in reachability), their PPS was
limited to the area around their hand, just as in the
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healthy subjects before the cane-use. Such a speci-
ﬁcity of tool-use-dependent plasticity of PPS has
been recently corroborated by Bourgeois and col-
leagues (Bourgeois, Farnè, & Coello, 2014) who also
demonstrated that a tool had to give a functional
beneﬁt to the arm in order to shape the PPS extent.
They asked healthy subjects to perform a reachability
judgement task, before and after using a tool, which
could increase the arm length by either 60 cm (70-
cm-long tool, 10-cm handle) or 0 cm (short tool 10
cm long, 10-cm handle). Reachability judgments
were selectively modiﬁed by tool-use, subjects consid-
ering farther locations to be reachable only after using
the long tool, whereas no modiﬁcations were
observed when the arm length remained unchanged.
Despite initial agreement on the fact that active
tool-use was necessary to trigger PPS extension,
more recent studies have challenged this view. Mere
tool-use observation, while passively holding the
same tool, seems actually sufﬁcient to remap the
PPS (Costantini, Ambrosini, Sinigaglia, & Gallese,
2011). Studies by Brozzoli and colleagues (Brozzoli,
Cardinali, Pavani, & Farnè, 2010; Brozzoli, Pavani,
Urquizar, Cardinali, & Farnè, 2009) have actually
revealed that changes in PPS may be observed
when the bare hand moves to grasp a target object.
Such an action-dependent modiﬁcation of the PPS,
as measured by the classical crossmodal congruency
effect paradigm (Spence, Pavani, & Driver, 2004),
takes place upon action starts and is further modu-
lated during action execution, meaning that its remap-
ping is regulated online, even when no tool-use is
involved (Brozzoli et al., 2010, 2009). In addition,
Serino and colleagues (Serino, Canzoneri, Marzolla, di
Pellegrino, & Magosso, 2015) have recently developed
a computational model able to simulate PPS neurons
and behaviour in an audio–tactile interaction that
allows for testing tool-use-dependent plasticity.
They recreated the conditions of PPS remapping via
tool-use using a simple audio–tactile training: A tem-
porally correlated stimulation providing touch on the
hand and auditory (or visual) input at a distance in
space turned out to be sufﬁcient to mimic the
sensory–motor consequences of tool-use, hence
causing an extension of the PPS. It thus appears
that, more than the tool itself, the multisensory
inputs that are typically generated by active tool-
use are crucial to extend the PPS. Either active or
passive, the functional experience with the tool
seems ultimately to play a prominent role, as
suggested by the gradual extension of PPS induced
by the use of variable tool lengths (Farnè, Iriki,
et al., 2005) and the durable modiﬁcations of the
PPS that one can observe in “proﬁcient” tool-users
even in passive conditions (Bassolino, Serino,
Ubaldi, & Làdavas, 2010). Notably, in the latter
study the remapping after using or holding a compu-
ter mouse was observed only for the hand usually
operating the mouse, but not the opposite hand,
again suggesting a relatively high level of speciﬁcity
in tool-use-dependent plasticity of the PPS.
From a theoretical perspective, de Vignemont and
Iannetti (2014) have recently argued for the existence
of two functionally distinct representations of PPS, the
ﬁrst being dedicated to protection of the body toward
threats (the so-called “ﬂight zone”), and the second to
interactions with surrounding objects that the body
wants to act upon (reaching/working space). In this
context, tool-use seems to refer preferably to the
latter, even if typical protective responses, such as
the skin conductance response (SCR), can be modiﬁed
by tool-use. In a recent study, Rossetti et al. (A. Rossetti
et al., 2015, Experiment 1) measured this physiological
variable for an incoming threat when a medical needle
approached the subject’s hand: The anticipatory pain
response was obviously highest when the needle
actually touched the hand, and stayed high around
the hand (5 cm), but was clearly smaller when the
incoming threat was located in the far space
(40 cm). Remarkably, after an active period of tool-
use to retrieve some distant objects, the contact of
the hand-held tool by the same needle provoked an
opposite pattern on SCR modulation: The anticipatory
pain response seemed to decrease close to the hand,
but tended to increase for farther distances (20 and
40 cm), in such a way that the body responded to
farther incoming threatening stimuli. This study may
provide some evidence against an alternative
interpretation of the PPS modulation, which posits
that tool-use induces a shift of spatial attention to
the functional tip of the tool (Holmes, 2012; Holmes,
Calvert, & Spence, 2004, 2007; Holmes, Sanabria,
Calvert, & Spence, 2007; Holmes, Spence, Hansen,
Mackay, & Calvert, 2008), rather than a real extent of
PPS. Indeed, SCR changes were found along the
whole tool (and not only at the tip), and pure atten-
tional training (e.g., passively holding the tool while
detecting a missing target in a series of 15) did not
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extend the PPS, while active tool-use did (see also
Bonifazi, Farnè, Rinaldesi, & Làdavas, 2007).
Overall, the ever-growing interest into the plastic
properties of PPS has contributed a large body of evi-
dence supporting the notion that tool-use does
indeed modify the way our brain perceive the space
around us. Yet, it has recently become clear that the
PPS can be dynamically remapped by merely
moving a bare hand (Brozzoli et al., 2010, 2009), and
active tool-use is possibly not necessary to PPS remap-
ping, as long as the synchrony of its sensorimotor con-
sequences is preserved (Serino et al., 2007). When
considering recent studies on the effects of tool-use
on the body representation for action (i.e., the body
schema), it seems reasonable to doubt as to whether
tool-use interrogates speciﬁcally and solely the PPS
representation. In what follows, we focus on tool-use
approaches used to observe the plasticity of body
representations.
2. Tool-use shapes the body
Besides changing the space around us by extending
our peripersonal space, tool-use has been shown to
modify the representation of our own body. In this
section, after a non-exhaustive overview of different
body representations, we pursue two main objectives.
The ﬁrst one is to testify about the beneﬁts of tool-use
as a paradigm to assess plasticity of body represen-
tations. The second aim is to suggest some of the
main points one should take into consideration
when using such tool-use-based approach to tackle
body representations.
Bodily representations: Body structural
description, body schema, body image
As pointed out by several authors, while the body
schema seems universally accepted and well
described, with a relatively unifying deﬁnition, the
other body representations (BR) remain conceptually
and functionally difﬁcult to disentangle. We chose
here to mainly follow the conceptual analysis and cri-
teria offered by de Vignemont (2010). Two main
models have been proposed to try explaining the sub-
division of the BR; ﬁrst, the dyadic model dichotomizes
the body schema (BS), a sensorimotor representation
grounded into action, and the body image (BI), an
action-free BR (Gallagher, 2005; Y. Rossetti, Rode, &
Boisson, 1995). Second, the triadic model proposed
by Schwoebel and others (Schwoebel & Coslett,
2005; see also Sirigu, Grafman, Bressler, & Sunderland,
1991), rather split the BI into two distinct represen-
tations: the body semantics, which constitutes the
conceptual and linguistic level of body parts, and
the body structural description (BSD), which is a
visuospatial map of the body parts and their topologi-
cal relationships. With that in mind, we chose here to
label body representations (BR) the cognitive umbrella
under which we then focus on three of them – namely,
the body structural description, the body image, and
the body schema. Indeed, these three BR have in
common the fact of containing some spatial layouts
of the body, a sort of spatial metrics that can
potentially be affected by tool-use, which is absent
in the body semantics. Additionally, we focus on
these functionally speciﬁc BR as they have been
shown to dissociate and rely on partially segregated
neuroanatomical bases (Schwoebel, Buxbaum, &
Coslett, 2004; Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005; Schwoebel,
Coslett, & Buxbaum, 2001). Thus, we refer to BSD as
the subdivision of the BI in the triadic model, and to
the BI as the more general entity referred to by
dyadic models.
The body structural description (BSD)
Owing to the fact that, to our best knowledge, no pre-
vious study has assessed the effects of tool-use on the
BSD, we only brieﬂy refer to it in this review. Indeed,
the BSD gathers structural information about location
of body parts in the body and with respect to one
another, in a way that is considered as mainly visuos-
patial and conscious (see Table 1). A few studies have
attempted setting the neural bases of BSD in the left
hemisphere, especially in the left temporal lobe
(Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005) and in the posterior intra-
parietal sulcus (IPS; Corradi-Dell’Acqua, Hesse, Rumiati,
& Fink, 2008; Corradi-Dell’Acqua, Tomasino, & Fink,
2009; Felician et al., 2004). However, all these
authors agree on the difﬁculty in disentangling the
neural bases of the different body representations,
possibly due to the limited number of studies. For
example, both BSD and the body image (see below)
seem to be impaired following left temporal brain
damage (Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005). A deﬁcit in the
BSD will cause some trouble in identifying human
body parts on oneself, or others: the so-called
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auto- (or hetero-) topagnosia (Buxbaum & Coslett,
2001; Felician, Ceccaldi, Didic, Thinus-Blanc, & Poncet,
2003; Felician et al., 2004; Sirigu et al., 1991). A major
role in building and updating this topological represen-
tation of the body is played by visual, as compared
to proprioceptive and sensorimotor, input (Tessari,
Ottoboni, Baroni, Symes, & Nicoletti, 2012). Thus, its
dominant visual and conscious nature might be part
of the reasons why the BSD has so far been neglected
in the ﬁeld of tool-use, which has given preference to
either unconscious multisensory (PPS) or propriocep-
tive (BS) processes. Nonetheless, in the light of more
recent evidence showing tool-use effects to impact
also mainly visual and putatively conscious represen-
tations (e.g., the BI, Miller, Longo, & Saygin, 2014; see
below), we would expect that the BSD, under yet
unknown experimental circumstances, may also be
affected by tool-use.
The body schema (BS)
Since the introduction of the “postural schemata” by
Head and Holmes (Head & Holmes, 1911; see also
Bonnier, 1905), based upon a series of neuropsycholo-
gical studies, the so-far most commonly used term for
the body representation for action is body schema
(see Table 1). Despite decades of confusion between
labels and concepts among BS, body image, and peri-
personal space (see, for discussion, Berlucchi & Aglioti,
2010; Cardinali, Brozzoli, & Farnè, 2009; de Vignemont,
2010), the BS has come to a relatively consensual deﬁ-
nition: a highly plastic representation of the body
parts, in terms of posture, shape, and size, that can
be used to execute or imagine executing movements
accurately (Medina & Coslett, 2010). The BS allows for
execution and constant monitoring of our actions and
appears to be fed mainly by proprioceptive, but also
tactile and kinaesthetic, information (Head & Holmes,
1911; Shenton, Schwoebel, & Coslett, 2004). In terms
of its neural underpinnings, the few available studies
suggest that the BS depends on the activity of the
somatosensory cortices, the intraparietal sulcus
(Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2009; Ehrsson, Kito, Sadato,
Passingham, & Naito, 2005), and the dorsolateral
frontal cortices (Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005). Thanks
to the BS, we are capable of locating our body and
its parts in space, knowing both where our left hand
is, for example, and how to get there with our right
hand, as well as whether our legs are stretched,
bent, or crossed under the table (i.e., without vision).
This information is refreshed instantaneously at
every single movement of our body. Importantly, we
typically become aware of the information carried
out in the BS, as well as of their updating, only when
we make a conscious effort. Otherwise, most of the
BS activity and outcome is largely considered to
occur unconsciously. Thus, the BS is essentially sensor-
imotor in nature. As such, many studies have tried
characterizing the BS with either somatosensory or
motor tasks. As a consequence, several paradigms
have been proposed to test the BS, such as tactile
localization and tactile distance perception tasks
(Anema et al., 2009; Canzoneri et al., 2013; de Vigne-
mont, Ehrsson, & Haggard, 2005), motor imagery
(Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005), or ballistic movements
(Y. Rossetti et al., 1995; Y. Rossetti, Rode, & Boisson,
2001). As we detail below, most of them have
also been used to assess the plastic properties of the BS.
The body image (BI)
Most typically brought in opposition to the BS (Berluc-
chi & Aglioti, 2010; de Vignemont, 2010), the BI has
been conceptualized as a conscious, lexical, and
semantic representation of the body and its parts,
with their names and associated functions (Coslett,
Saffran, & Schwoebel, 2002; Sirigu et al., 1991). The
term BI, coined by Schilder (1935), has become the
most accepted label for this BR, for which, however,
consensus is not wide, and the proposed testing pro-
tocols may differ largely. Studies revealed damaged BI
following temporal lesions (Schwoebel & Coslett,
2005). While in its initial conception the superﬁcial
schemata included the localization of stimulation on
the body surface (Anema et al., 2009; Paillard,
Michel, & Stelmach, 1983; but see Medina & Coslett,
2010), neuropsychological evidence indicated that
the BI contains semantic knowledge about body
parts and their function (Buxbaum & Coslett, 2001;
Sirigu et al., 1991). At odds with the BS, the BI
appears to rely heavily on visual inputs (see Table 1).
Possibly for this reason, the term BI is more and
more generally employed to refer to the visually
based representation of the body shape and size –
in other words, the visually based metrics of the
body. In addition, BI is nowadays classically referred
to in the rubber hand illusion studies (e.g., Kammers,
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Kootker, Hogendoorn, & Dijkerman, 2010), or other
types of hand distortions (Medina, Khurana, &
Coslett, 2015; Tamè, Farnè, & Pavani, 2011, 2013;
Treshi-Marie Perera, Newport, & McKenzie, 2015) and
body related disorders, such as the body integrity
identity disorder (see, for a comprehensive view,
Urgesi, 2015). Furthermore, in the last decade the BI
has become of great interest in relation to patients
with eating disorders, such as bulimia and anorexia
nervosa (see Cicmil & Eli, 2014; Gardner & Brown,
2014; Lang, Lopez, Stahl, Tchanturia, & Treasure,
2014), a growing interest testiﬁed by the existence
of a speciﬁc journal (Body Image, An International
Journal of Research). Thus, the term BI has been put
in relation to many other concepts, like body owner-
ship and appearance, making the nosological
problem of this BR and its relationships with the
other BRs even more complex.
With this brief, taxonomic overview in mind, we
now turn to our focus and interrogate the plastic
features of these BR through the perspective of
tool-use.
Body schema and body image modiﬁcations by
tool-use
Body schema
Our group has contributed converging evidence for
BS plasticity after tool-use (Cardinali et al., 2011; Car-
dinali, Frassinetti, et al., 2009; Cardinali et al., 2012).
Indeed, Cardinali, Frassinetti, et al. (2009) reported
for the ﬁrst time that the BS, in this case the uncon-
scious arm representation as probed by execution of
reach-to-grasp movements, was modiﬁed after using
a mechanical grabber for 10 minutes. We recorded
neurotypical participants’ free-hand movement kin-
ematics before and after using this tool. Tool reach-
and-grasp actions modiﬁed the subsequent free-
hand movement kinematic proﬁle, as reﬂected by
the observation that participants took longer to
reach both velocity and deceleration peaks, resulting
in a longer movement time. In addition, the ampli-
tude of both velocity and deceleration peaks was
smaller, as compared to that observed during the
bare hand movements performed before tool-use.
Such changes did not occur for the grasping com-
ponent of the movement (e.g., ﬁnger opening), but
were limited to the transport one, thus suggesting
a modiﬁcation of the representation of the forearm,
but not the hand. Subjects literally acted as if they
had a longer arm after tool-use. Indeed, when com-
pared to people with short(er) arms, participants
with long(er) arms naturally displayed bare hand
reach-to-grasp movements that were characterized
by longer latencies, as well as reduced amplitudes,
of velocity and deceleration peaks, with overall
longer movement times. The kinematic pattern of
long-armed people is thus similar to that observed
after tool-use, irrespective of the real arm length
(see Cardinali, Frassinetti, et al., 2009, Supplementary
Material). These ﬁndings were taken as evidence for
tool incorporation into the arm representation and,
hence, plasticity of the BS.
Similar effects of “represented arm lengthening”
were obtained when subjects were required to
quickly point with their left index ﬁngertip at anatom-
ical landmarks of their right arm (elbow, wrist, middle
ﬁnger) where an unseen tactile stimulus was deliv-
ered. After tool-use, subjects pointed to the wrist
and elbow as if they were farther apart, hence they
clearly relied on an extended arm length represen-
tation. Interestingly, their hand length representation,
as indexed by the distance between the wrist and the
middle ﬁngertip end-pointing locations, remained
unchanged. These results match the kinematics
Table 1. Criteria used to qualify bodily and spatial representations.

















Metric body knowledge for
action
(body parts’ position and
size)
Body percept, concept, and
affect;
Visual metrics of the body
Structural information about body parts
location
Accessibility Mainly unconscious Mainly unconscious Conscious Conscious
Note: Here we subdivide the body and space representation according to different criteria – namely, sensory inputs, format, functional properties and
accessibility.
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pattern well, with a modiﬁcation of the transport com-
ponent of the movement, while the grasping one was
left unchanged (Cardinali, Frassinetti, et al., 2009).
More recently, we investigated the hypothesis
according to which the mere mental imagery of
tool-use could be sufﬁcient to modify one’s arm’s
length representation. Indeed, Fitt’s law, according
to which the movement duration of an action
increases with its difﬁculty, is also preserved in case
of tool-use imagery (Macuga & Papailiou, 2012).
Given that both actual and mental imagery of tool-
use are known to alter space perception (Davoli,
Brockmole, & Witt, 2012; Witt & Profﬁtt, 2008), we
reasoned that tool-use imagery should trigger, on sub-
sequent hand movement kinematics, similar effects to
those induced by actual tool-use (Baccarini et al.,
2014). In this study, we asked healthy participants to
perform free-hand reach-to-grasp movements,
before and after merely imagining performing this
movement either with their hand (Day 1) or with a
mechanical grabber passively held in their hand (Day
2). We ensured that the motor imagery was accurately
performed by introducing changes in the orientation
of the thumb–ﬁnger opposition axis needed to grasp
the target object (after Frak, Paulignan, & Jeannerod,
2001), thus making the task more difﬁcult for some
orientations. The results showed that movement
time was similarly affected by this manipulation of
task difﬁculty in both actual and imagined reach-to-
grasp movements. Crucially, after tool-use imagery
participants displayed reduced amplitude peaks for
the transport component (velocity and deceleration
peaks), while there was no kinematic change after
imagining to use the hand to execute the same move-
ments (Baccarini et al., 2014). These results are similar
to those observed after actual tool-use, which indeed
consisted in the reduction in the maximal amplitude
and protracted latency of some transport parameters,
as well as the global lengthening of movement time
(Cardinali, Frassinetti, et al., 2009). Taken together,
these ﬁndings converge to indicate that imagining
reaching out an object with a tool may be sufﬁcient
to trigger its plastic incorporation in the BS.
Noteworthy, participants were familiarized with the
tool in the preceding day, and could see it while
holding it, so both vision and proprioception were
possibly at stake in producing the effects following
mental tool-use imagery (Baccarini et al., 2014). In pro-
gress work in our laboratory, we are currently seeking
for empirical evidence that the plasticity of BS could
occur without recurring to any visual inputs, given
that proprioception should in principle be sufﬁcient
to trigger body representation changes (Martel et al.,
2014, Cognitive Neuroscience Society, CNS, abstract).
This line of study is in keeping with the old tenet
that proprioception and more generally somatosensa-
tion should allow a privileged access to the BS (Cardi-
nali, Brozzoli, et al., 2009). In a related study, Cardinali
and coworkers (Cardinali et al., 2011) asked healthy
blindfolded participants to point quickly and accu-
rately with their left index ﬁngertip, to a speciﬁc
location on their right arm that had previously been
touched by the experimenter (ﬁnger, wrist, or
elbow). In another condition, subjects had to verbally
report where (on their right arm) they had been
touched, by reading aloud the number on a ruler
kept parallel to their (unseen) right arm in front of
them. The distance between the different landing
and read-out points was then calculated to assess
the represented length of two body segments: the
hand (ﬁngertip–wrist distance) and the forearm
(wrist–elbow distance), both before and after using
the same mechanical grabber to perform reach-to-
grasp movements. Participants’ performance revealed
a signiﬁcant effect of tool-use on both tasks, but only
for the representation of forearm length; the hand
length remained unchanged. When participants
were making either conscious verbal judgements
about, or unconscious movements toward, the
tactile stimulation, the represented distance between
the elbow and the wrist was extended after tool-use
(Cardinali et al., 2011).
The neural bases of tool-use-dependent plasticity,
whether during actual, imagined, or observed move-
ments, have started to be investigated through func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),
electroencephalography (EEG), and positron emission
tomography (PET) studies (Lewis, 2006). Although
still limited in numbers, those studies have revealed
the involvement of the frontoparietal cortices (Galli-
van, McLean, Valyear, & Culham, 2013; Jacobs, Daniel-
meier, & Frey, 2010), especially the superior parietal
lobule (SPL; Di Russo et al., 2006), and the left intrapar-
ietal sulcus (IPS; (Costantini et al., 2011; Tomasino,
Weiss, & Fink, 2012; Valyear, Cavina-Pratesi, Stiglick,
& Culham, 2007), or the posterior parietal cortex
(PPC), which is known to integrate visual and somato-
sensory information (Inoue et al., 2001). Studies on
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monkeys highlighted an increase of grey matter in this
same circuit after tool-use (Quallo et al., 2009). It is also
believed that some neurons in area 5 of the parietal
lobe could be the core of the BS, as they code for
arm position through visual and somatosensory infor-
mation in the monkey brain (Graziano, Cooke, &
Taylor, 2000).
In the same way as PPS remapping, BS plasticity fol-
lowing tool-use relies on the functional importance of
the tool to perform the action (Sposito, Bolognini,
Vallar, & Maravita, 2012). In their study, Sposito and
colleagues (2012) questioned the modiﬁcation of the
metric representation of the body by tool-use. They
designed a forearm bisection task, consisting in esti-
mating the midpoint of one’s own forearm before
and after diversiﬁed tool-use training. After using a
60-cm-long tool, subjects indicated a more distal mid-
point, according to the hypothesis of an increased arm
length representation due to tool-use. Interestingly,
after using a 20-cm-long tool, which did not substan-
tially alter the reaching space, the described effect
failed to appear, thus highlighting the importance of
the gain in reachability provided by a tool as an essen-
tial component to lead to a BS update. The role played
by the conscious feeling of ownership towards the
arm using the tool has been revealed as critical, in
some particular cases, as that of brain-damaged
patients who suffer from a pathological embodiment
of another person’s arm at the place of their own
hemiplegic arm. Garbarini and colleagues (Garbarini
et al., 2015) asked four of these patients to estimate
the midpoint of their contralesional forearm before
and after 15 min of tool-use training (similar to
Sposito et al., 2012). When the patients were con-
vinced to use the tool with their own paralysed arm
(though they were merely looking at the experimenter
arm + tool usage) they misjudged their forearm mid-
point more distally (i.e., towards the hand), just as neu-
rotypical participants did with respect to their real
own arm. This ﬁnding deﬁnitively points to the exist-
ence of intimate relationships between the BR and
the sense of ownership, as the possibility that tool-
use affects the BS seems clearly conditional to the
(possibly implicit) self-attribution of the effector
acting with a tool. These authors, considering tool-
use in terms of tool-embodiment, opened the ﬁeld
to studies about prosthetic arms, and the way they
are integrated into the body representations, for an
optimal sensorimotor control (Romano, Caffa,
Hernandez-Arieta, Brugger, & Maravita, 2015). Pros-
theses can indeed be considered as tools in the
sense that they allow the user to perform movements
and actions otherwise not possible. Prosthesis use, as
tool-use, changes the shape and size of the user’s
body in an attempt to restore it to its original state
by replacing a missing limb. If the concept of a tool
becoming a body part has been around since the
beginning of the nineteenth century, the idea that a
prosthesis can become a body part has been accepted
as true and obvious even more easily. The main issue
with the research about embodiment is the quite
vague deﬁnition of embodiment. Murray (2008)
deﬁnes embodiment as “the way in which people
experience their own body” (p. 127). This deﬁnition,
while correct, includes many different phenomena
and processes. More recently, de Vignemont (2011)
proposed a systematic deﬁnition of embodiment
that postulates the existence of three layers: motor
embodiment (an object is embodied if it moves as a
body part and is perceived as under one’s control);
spatial (an object is embodied if the space it is
located in is processed as body space); and affective
(an object is embodied if the individual shows the
same affective reactions as for his/her own body).
When all the three aspects are present, one can talk
about full embodiment.
A seminal work by Fraser (1984) used a kinematic
approach to assess whether a prosthesis can
become a body part. The rationale behind the study
was that if the prosthesis is embodied it should be
moved as a body part. Indeed, she found that the par-
ticipant had a similar kinematic proﬁle when perform-
ing movements with her intact arm as well as with her
prosthesis. A few years later, McDonnell and col-
leagues (McDonnell, Scott, Dickison, Theriault, &
Wood, 1989) investigated prosthesis embodiment in
a group of congenital and acquired amputees by
using a pointing task. They found that, when asked
to point to the (unseen) position in space of their
stump, amputees consistently overestimated the
length of their arm but only while wearing a prosthe-
sis. These two studies support the idea that prostheses
can be embodied into the body schema– that is, they
show motoric embodiment. However, they do not per
se justify the claim that prostheses are fully embodied.
Interviews have been used to test affective embodi-
ment (Murray, 2004, 2008). These studies reported that
amputees can experience and describe various
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degrees of embodiment, which seems to be related to
the amount of use of the prosthesis. Such relation
between use and embodiment does not seem to be
linear or unidirectional. Indeed, it seems that embodi-
ment arises after a considerable amount of use,
necessary to reach a level of comfort with the prosthe-
sis. On the other hand, embodiment is suggested to
play a role in supporting amputees in continuing
using the prostheses. Pazzaglia and colleagues (Pazza-
glia, Galli, Scivoletto, & Molinari, 2013; see also Galli,
Noel, Canzoneri, Blanke, & Serino, 2015) developed a
new comprehensive questionnaire to investigate
wheelchair embodiment in patients with spinal cord
injury. The 11 questions addressed different aspects
of patients’ personal experience with the wheelchair,
and a principal component analysis revealed that
the majority of patients experience the tool as being
part of their body. Interestingly, they also perceive it
as a functional substitute for their legs but not as an
external tool. That is, the wheelchair is the legs
rather than a tool supporting or extending them.
Finally, a growing number of studies used a modi-
ﬁed rubber hand illusion protocol where the partici-
pant stump and the prosthesis where synchronously
or asynchronously stimulated (D’Alonzo, Clemente, &
Cipriani, 2015; Ehrsson et al., 2008; Giummarra, Geor-
giou-Karistianis, Nicholls, Gibson, & Bradshaw, 2010;
Rosén et al., 2009; Schmalzl, Kalckert, Ragnö, &
Ehrsson, 2014). They reported that amputees can
experience a rubber hand or a prosthesis as their
own hand as shown by the fact that they feel the
tactile stimulation on the stump as coming from the
rubber hand/prosthesis and show physiological
responses, as assessed with skin conductance
response measures, to a threat to the prosthesis.
These data show spatial and affective embodiment
of prosthesis in amputees. However, the RHI-like para-
digm might not be representative of real-life experi-
ence with a prosthesis. In such a quite artiﬁcial
situation, amputees are not asked to control or act
with the prosthesis, as they would in real life, but to
passively observe it being brushed. As such, they
speak more of whether a rubber-hand-like illusion
can be induced using a prosthetic hand than of pros-
thesis embodiment on amputees, providing weak
insight on whether and how embodiment can
support prosthesis use and reduce rejection.
In addition, tool-use-dependent plasticity of the BS
seems to be limb-speciﬁc, as recently suggested by
Jovanov and colleagues (Jovanov, Clifton, Mazalek,
Nitsche, & Welsh, 2015). In this study, participants
were asked to look at a screen with a picture of a
woman holding a rake, with the arm outstretched per-
pendicular to her body. Then they had to respond as
fast as possible to some targets appearing on the
hand, the tip of the rake, or on the foot of the
woman, with either their own hand or their own
foot. This task was performed before and after using
a rake to grasp and move a tennis ball. After using
the rake, subjects were faster to respond to targets
appearing on the rake image, while they kept the
same reaction time for foot- and hand-related targets.
Regarding the limb speciﬁcity, and as tool-use
studies classically used rake or mechanical grabbers,
one crucial aspect has been neglected for a long
time: the tool morphology, as studied recently by
Miller and colleagues (Miller et al., 2014). These
authors referred to an implicit body representation,
and even if they prefer the term “body model”
(Longo & Haggard, 2010), a supposedly distinct rep-
resentation from both the BS and the BI, we discuss
its ﬁndings in terms of their relevance to the BS. In
their study, Miller et al. (2014) asked subjects to
perform a tactile distance judgement task (TDJ):
They stimulated them in two distinct points, at two
different locations (hand/arm and forehead), and
asked participants to judge where the distance was
bigger. Although clearly conscious and perceptive,
the fact that the input was tactile and allowed for
accessing to the metrics of the body led us to consider
this task as assessing, at least partly, the BS. The TDJ
was performed before and after using a tool to
grasp a balloon: either a classical mechanical
grabber or a hand-shaped tool. Crucially, after using
the classical arm-shaped grabber, tactile distance per-
ception on the hand was not modiﬁed, while that on
the arm was. Conversely, after using the hand-
shaped grabber, only tactile perception on the hand
was modiﬁed. Those changes were opposite in direc-
tion: increased width and decreased length of the
hand/the arm. These ﬁndings highlight that tool mor-
phology itself, linked with the functional role of the
tool, is crucial in the updating of the BS.
Several studies (Baccarini et al., 2014; Cardinali,
Frassinetti, et al., 2009; Martel et al., 2014, CNS
abstract) employing tools whose basic property
was to lengthen the participants’ arm, have found
kinematic changes following tool-use that were
COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 91
limited to the reaching component of the move-
ment. This consistently replicated ﬁnding reinforce
the idea that with an arm-lengthening tool, the rep-
resentation of the arm is selectively modiﬁed. The
changes in the hand perceptual representation
reported by Miller et al. (2014) after using a hand-
widening tool could thus be concomitant with kin-
ematic changes that could be selective of the grasp-
ing part of the movement. Results from our group
conﬁrm this prediction: When the distal length of
the thumb and index ﬁngers is lengthened, sub-
sequent free-hand prehensile movements are
altered selectively with respect to the grasping com-
ponent of the movement, leaving the transport com-
ponent unchanged (Cardinali, Brozzoli, Finos, Roy, &
Farnè, 2016). One ﬁnding that deserves discussion is
that the reduced length in the arm perceptual rep-
resentation reported by Miller and colleagues after
the use of the long grabber does not readily ﬁt
the increased arm length representation described
by the post-tool kinematics (Baccarini et al., 2014;
Cardinali, Frassinetti, et al., 2009; Martel et al., 2014,
CNS abstract) or the post-tool somatosensory
driven pointing (Cardinali et al., 2011; Cardinali, Fras-
sinetti, et al., 2009). Miller and collaborators have
suggested that this discrepancy could be the result
of the difference between the tasks across studies.
Critically, to our best knowledge, the only other
study that observed a shortening of perceived arm
length after tool-use (Ganesh, Yoshioka, Osu, &
Ikegami, 2014) required, once again, the conscious
participants’ estimation of the size of their effectors.
They observed that what they suggest to be the
earliest stage of tool incorporation goes with a short-
ening of the perceived arm length, which then
turns into the previously reported lengthening of
perceived arm length with protracted tool-use.
The task used by Miller (Miller et al., 2014) was orig-
inally used by de Vignemont and colleagues (de Vig-
nemont et al., 2005) who determined that a
vibration of the biceps led to the subjectively experi-
enced extension to the right arm. Recently Tajadura-
Jiménez and colleagues (Tajadura-Jiménez et al.,
2012) showed evidence of BS updating by introducing
an audio-tactile conﬂict. Participants had to tap on the
ﬂoor with their ﬁst at different locations, and the
tapping sound was manipulated to originate from
different distances. If this task recalls the audio-
tactile synchrony paradigms used by Serino and his
colleagues (Serino et al., 2015), hence possibly invol-
ving an extension of the PPS, Tajadura-Jiménez and
collaborators used a tactile distance judgement task
akin to that used by Miller and colleagues (Miller
et al., 2014) to assess the BR. When the sound came
from twice the distance from the tapping action, the
tactile distance task was biased in the direction of an
elongated BR. These ﬁndings were recently extended
to investigate the role played by agency and
kinaesthesia in producing these effects (Tajadura-
Jiménez, Tsakiris, Marquardt, & Bianchi-Berthouze,
2015). Overall, one may wonder whether a conscious
estimation task could also inﬂuence the BS after
tool-use, as it seems to inﬂuence the PPS and possibly
other forms of body elongation after synchronous
somatosensory and auditory stimulation at a distance
from the body. The study reported in the PPS section
above by Serino and colleagues (Serino et al., 2015)
showed that PPS extension (similar to what typically
induced by tool-use) could also be obtained by mere
audio-tactile synchrony. It thus seems hard to clearly
qualify which BR is selectively tackled by these multi-
sensory-stimulation-based approaches. Other studies
have highlighted that tool-use can indeed shape
both PPS and BS when both were tested at a percep-
tual level (Canzoneri et al., 2013), although the similar
outcome does not necessarily call for an identity
between these representations and cognitive pro-
cesses (see, for a dissociation, Bassolino, Finisguerra,
Canzoneri, Serino, & Pozzo, 2014). One further possi-
bility is that once directly modiﬁed by tool-use, the
change induced within the BS can spill over the BI,
or/and the PPS (Cardinali, Brozzoli, et al., 2009; Cardi-
nali et al., 2011).
Body image
In our view, the rubber hand illusion (RHI) is to the
body image what tool-use is to the peripersonal
space. Until recently, the BI has mainly been referred
to the concept of body ownership in studies of the
RHI, which consists in tricking the subjects to believe
that a fake rubber hand is their own, by brushing
their unseen hand synchronously with a fake hand
(see, for review Kilteni, Maselli, Kording, & Slater,
2015; Tsakiris, 2010). Again, BI and PPS have become
a common arena for framing inﬂuential theoretical
models of how the body is owned and represented
in the brain (Blanke, Slater, & Serino, 2015; Makin,
Holmes, & Ehrsson, 2008). However, as tool-use
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started to “dig its way” as a paradigm to interrogate
other BR such as the body schema, the interest
started to grow regarding the relationships between
tools, their use, and the BI, particularly since it
seemed difﬁcult to feel ownership over non-hand-
shaped tools (Tsakiris, Carpenter, James, & Fotopou-
lou, 2010; de Vignemont & Farnè, 2010), a limit that
could possibly extend to enacted, but not necessarily
self-sensed, robotic hands (Romano et al., 2015). In this
rich but complex theoretical framework, the BI initially
appeared to be immune to tool-use. For example, in
the work by Cardinali and colleagues alluded to
above (Cardinali et al., 2011), there were two
additional conditions that, by manipulating the type
of the input and output task modalities, were
designed to tackle more speciﬁcally the BI. In one con-
dition, blindfolded subjects had to point quickly and
accurately with their left index ﬁnger to a speciﬁc
location on their right arm that, instead of being sig-
nalled by tactile stimulation, was named by the exper-
imenter (“ﬁnger”, “wrist”, or “elbow”). In another
condition, subjects had to verbally report the position
of the named anatomical landmark by reading aloud
the number corresponding to these landmarks from
a ruler that was visible in front of them. The distance
between the landing and read aloud locations was
then calculated to assess the represented length of
arm and hand, both before and after using the same
long mechanical grabber. Results showed no change
in the arm (or hand) representation after tool-use in
either condition. Noteworthy, the same subjects actu-
ally showed signiﬁcant changes of arm (but not hand)
length estimation in the two conditions where touch
was used as input modality to indicate the anatomical
landmarks, and thus designed to tackle the BS (Cardi-
nali et al., 2011). Overall, this pattern of results
suggests that tool-use had no consequences on the
conscious representation of the body (e.g., the BI).
Among the main features of the BI, besides that of
being typically accessed via conscious explicit tasks,
there is its heavy dependence upon vision. Miller
and colleagues (Miller, Longo, & Saygin, 2015, Vision
Sciences Society, VSS abstract) addressed this issue
by asking participants to judge whether a depicted
hand was wider than their own, or not, before and
after practising with a hand-shaped tool that was
much bigger than average human hands. When
tool-use was performed with visual feedback, most
of the subjects judged that they had a wider and
shorter hand when retested after use of such a tool.
In contrast, when blindfolded participants used the
mechanical hand, no modiﬁcation of the conscious
hand representation occurred afterwards. Hence
visual feedbacks could be necessary to update the
BI. However, we anticipate that this debate is far
from being over, as, for example, the RHI has been
observed even without visual input, when blindfolded
subjects reported the impression of stroking their own
hand while the experimenter was stroking it and at the
same time using their other hand to touch a rubber
hand (Ehrsson, Holmes, & Passingham, 2005).
When turning to consider the neural underpinnings
of the BI, at least under the umbrella of the concept of
self-awareness, many studies have pointed at the right
temporo-parietal junction as one of the best candidate
regions. Lesions in this area may result in neglect of
the left side of the body (Mort et al., 2003) and anosog-
nosia for hemiplegia (Berlucchi & Aglioti, 1997). More
recent studies have the pointed to other regions
that may be critical for BI as somatoparaphrenia, the
delusional beliefs towards one’s own affected limb,
have been observed with lesions in deep cortical
and subcortical grey structures (thalamus, basal
ganglia, amygdala), as well as in medio-frontal
regions, such as the middle and inferior frontal
gyrus, postcentral gyrus, or temporo-parietal areas
(Feinberg, Venneri, Simone, Fan, & Northoff, 2010;
Gandola et al., 2012; Invernizzi et al., 2013; Romano,
Gandola, Bottini, & Maravita, 2014; Vallar & Ronchi,
2009). Right posterior insula also appears involved
when the sense of limb ownership is evoked (Baier &
Karnath, 2008). Direct electrical stimulation of the
right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ) in a neurosurgi-
cal patient elicited experiences of seeing her body
from an external perspective (“out-of-body experi-
ence”), and of illusory transformations of the arms
and legs (Blanke, Ortigue, Landis, & Seeck, 2002).
Based on these results, rTPJ may be the neural
source of a model of one’s own body, against which
multisensory stimuli are tested. To test this hypothesis,
Tsakiris, Costantini, and Haggard (2008), delivered
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) immediately
after synchronous visuotactile stimulation to investi-
gate the role of this area in the processing of
sensory events during RHI (Tsakiris et al., 2008).
Overall, TMS over rTPJ reduced the extent to which
the rubber hand was incorporated into the mental
representation of one’s own body, and it also
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increased the incorporation of a neutral object (e.g., a
spoon), as measured by the proprioceptive drift
towards or away from the viewed object. An object
(i.e., a rubber hand) that would normally have been
perceived as part of the subject’s own body was no
longer signiﬁcantly distinguished from a clearly
neutral object, suggesting that the disruption of
neural activity over rTPJ blocked the contribution of
the body-model in the assimilation of current
sensory input, making the discrimination between
what may or may not be part of one’s body ambigu-
ous. While an exhaustive review of this line of research
is outside the scope of the present review, we refer the
interested reader to a recent authoritative review on
the subject of bodily self-consciousness (Blanke
et al., 2015).
General discussion
As mentioned in the introduction, this review was
aimed at addressing two main issues: testifying of
the beneﬁts of tool-use as a paradigm to assess
body representation plasticity, and to highlight the
major points we should take into consideration
when studying body representations.
Tool-use, a tool to assess body representations
We have tried here to gather the available pieces of
evidence suggesting that tool-use allows for the
access to body representations and their plasticity.
Several studies converge in indicating that, when
used in real life, or even merely by mental imagery,
tools can be incorporated in what we have identiﬁed
as the body schema (Baccarini et al., 2014; Cardinali
et al., 2011; Cardinali, Frassinetti, et al., 2009; Cardinali
et al., 2012). In this respect, it is important to notice
that in all these studies, the object to be grasped
with either the tool or the hand was always located
inside the reaching space of the arm. Far from being
a methodological detail, the fact of acting in the
same space with the tool and the hand allows us to
isolate tool-use speciﬁc effects, ruling out possible
confounds due to the fact of acting with either effec-
tor in different sectors for space. Tool-use remapping
also appears to be limb-speciﬁc (Cardinali et al.,
2016; Jovanov et al., 2015) and dependent upon the
function and morphology of the tool (Cardinali et al.,
2016; Miller et al., 2014) to perform a speciﬁc action
(Sposito et al., 2012).
Some interesting questions remain to be
addressed. A major question is related to the
dynamics of the BS updating. Ganesh and colleagues
(Ganesh et al., 2014) testiﬁed of a fast initial reduction
of the arm representation, which is then followed by
the repeatedly reported extension of BS. Whether
this apparent discrepancy is entirely attributable to
the differences in the tasks used remains unclear,
and future investigations are awaited to elucidate
the temporal and spatial dynamics of the processes
contributing to tool embodiment (see, for review, de
Vignemont, in press). Last, but not least, all the
effects that have been reported so far following tool-
use are (supposedly) temporary. This assumed transi-
ent character can actually be contrasted by what
seems to be a rather permanent change in blind
cane expert users (Serino et al., 2007), and prolonged
tool-use may actually translate into more permanent
neural changes of BRs. Yet, if we readily accept the
term “plasticity” to deal with such tool-use-dependent
effects, we should probably think in terms of plasticity
also when those effects disappear. This spatio-tem-
poral plasticity remains so far unexplored: Is the
shrinking back gradual, or immediate like an elastic
band going back to its default size (de Vignemont &
Farnè, 2010), as has been observed for the periperso-
nal space retraction in adults and children (Caçola &
Gabbard, 2012)?
Tool-use, a useful yet not universal tool
Other important questions remain unanswered,
especially on how to test the BI to know for sure
whether it is immune to tool-use or not. Cardinali
and colleagues (Cardinali et al., 2011) tried identifying
which combination of inputs and outputs was needed
to exclusively or preferentially assess body represen-
tations: A pure motor task will allow access to the
BS, and be sensitive to tool-use, while a pure percep-
tual and verbal task will trigger the BI, with no mark
of tool-use. Strikingly, with a verbal input and a
motor output, no effect of tool-use was observed,
suggesting that this combination provides marginal
or no access to BS, being possibly more related to BI.
Conversely, a tactile input with a perceptual output
was sufﬁcient to make the key signature of tool incor-
poration visible. This ﬁnding may suggest that such a
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combination is sufﬁcient to reveal that BI is also sensi-
tive to tool-use. An alternative interpretation is,
however, possible – namely that the BS, once affected
by tool-use, may have mediated this plastic change
into the BI. This consideration also raises the point of
the possible functional interactions between BRs,
which remain, however, outside the scope of the
present review (see Kammers et al., 2010).
Despite some overlap in the way they can be
updated (Canzoneri et al., 2013) and, to some extent,
in the brain areas involved, the PPS and the BS are
possibly distinguishable through their sensory inputs
and functional properties (Cardinali, Brozzoli, et al.,
2009). Bassolino and others (Bassolino et al., 2014)
recently gave one of the ﬁrst insights into the dissoci-
able plasticity between PPS and BR. In a paradigm of
arm immobilization, they investigated how differently
or similarly the PPS and the BR would react to non-use
or over-use of the arm. Through several tasks, they
found that PPS representation did not change for
the over-used arm and was reduced for the non-
used arm, whereas BR of the arm was modiﬁed after
overuse but could not shrink after non-use. This
reinforces the hypothesis that, as the body cannot bio-
logically shrink, the BS can only extend, but never
changes in the opposite direction (Bassolino et al.,
2014; Cardinali, Brozzoli, et al., 2009; de Vignemont
et al., 2005; but see Ganesh et al., 2014; Miller et al.,
2014). Several studies have established that after sur-
gical extension of limbs in achondroplasic patients,
body representations, namely the BS and the explicit
BI, were modiﬁed toward a “normalization”when com-
pared to body-typical subjects (Cimmino et al., 2013;
Di Russo et al., 2006). The PPS also appeared enlarged
(Cimmino et al., 2013), as the physical length of the
arm is known to correlate with some spatial processes
at a distance (Longo & Lourenco, 2007). Thus, we think
we should be careful when choosing the tasks, inputs,
and outputs that we use when studying body and
space representation plasticity.
Before concluding, we wish to list some of what we
think are amongst the most urgent questions and
issues that future research efforts should consider. A
ﬁrst obvious question that remains open is the extent
to which a single tool-use paradigm (though already
enriched by many variants so far) can probe each and
all of the different BRs. While several ﬁndings converge
in showing that tool-use can contribute to the study of
the BS with some degree of speciﬁcity, new studies are
needed to provide more deﬁnitive answers with
respect to the BI. For certain, the so-far neglected sus-
ceptibility of the BSD to the tool-use paradigm should
be explored. The principledmotivation for a systematic
approach of tool-use as amodel paradigm for the study
of body representations resides, in our view, in the fact
that using the same paradigm to approach different BR
will, ﬁrst, elucidate whether they are generally or rather
speciﬁcally tackled by this manipulation; second, and
most important, such a systematic approach would
have themerit of contributing to deﬁne the critical con-
ditions to be met for a given BR to become, if possible,
sensitive to the representational plasticity induced by
tool-use. In that, tool-use could keep the promise of
opening a window into the study of body represen-
tations and their plasticity. Last, but not least, the sys-
tematic questioning of BR via tool-use paradigms can
help reﬁning the current models that we use to frame
these BR, by clarifying in more mechanistic terms
their operational deﬁnitions.
To conclude, we believe that tool-use, despite the
growing interest in the last years, still has many
things to offer, especially in the study of body represen-
tations and their plasticity. Its speciﬁcity and selectivity
to affect different BR may empower our capability to
disentangle the still unsolved questions about body
representations and their plastic modiﬁcation.
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